Miercuri, 30 Martie 2011 - 05:57 AM Aleg.RO: Basescu, un milion de dolari ironici prin Pentagon pentru familia lui Teo Peter

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Kamikaze

Telegramele Wikileaks 14

Cazul Teo Peter apare in mai multe telegrame trimise de catre Ambasada SUA de la Bucuresti la Washington . Dintre acestea, sase merita o atentie marita. Prima dateaza din 4 martie 2005 si este o informare a Ambsadei americane in legatura cu noul presedinte Traian Basescu, care urma sa faca o vizita la Washington in perioada 8-9 martie 2005. In corpul telegramei se mentioneaza ca Basescu va cere sprijinul Casei Albe pentru readucerea in Romania a sergentului american Van Goethem, implicat in accidentul mortal al lui Teo Peter.

Care, spunea Basescu, va fi judecat corect si, indiferent de rezultatul procesului, nu va sta nici o zi in inchisoare in Romania (pasajul original: “Nevertheless, President Basescu may strongly ask for White House support for the Marine’s return, probably repeating a promise made earlier to our Ambassador that the former detachment commander would receive a fair trial and, regardless of outcome, would not serve a single day in prison in Romania.”).

O informatie asemanatoare aparea si intr-o alta telegrama, datata 24 martie 2005, cu ocazia venirii la Bucuresti a adjunctului secretarului de stat Zoellick (pasajul original: “Nevertheless, PM Tariceanu and FM Ungureanu may ask for the Marine’s return, possibly repeating a promise made earlier to our Ambassador by Basescu that the former detachment commander would receive a fair trial and, regardless of outcome, would not serve a single day in prison in Romania.”). Alte trei telegrame (de pe 1 si 3 februarie 2006, respectiv 16 noiembrie 2007) descriu consecintele posibil grave ale pedepsei minore primite de Van Goethem in SUA (posibila retragere a trupelor din Irak, punerea in pericol a achizitiei de avioane F 16). Intr-o telegramam, insa, de pe 29 noiembrie 2007, apare o informatie curioasa: pentru ca SUA nu vor sa plateasca despagubiri mai mari de 80.000 USD pentru familia lui Teo Peter, Basescu propune o alta solutie.

Si anume: se ofera sa trimita Pentagonului, in secret, suma de un milion de dolari, astfel incit despagubirile primite de familia lui Teo Peter de la americani sa fie adecvate (pasajul original: “Ilinoiu commented that the sums that she had heard being considered would scarcely cover the amount expended by the GOR in this case (which she estimated at around USD $80K). Asked by the Ambassador what sort of figure the GOR had in mind, Ilinoiu did not respond directly, but said that in a previous conversation between President Basescu and former U.S. Ambassador Rosapepe, Basescu had offered to secretly provide the sum of USD $1 million to the Pentagon in order to ensure that the amount of money being provided to Peters’ survivors was adequate. (Note: Ilinoiu did not specify the circumstances or the timing of this discussion.)”

Valeriu Turcan, purtatorul de cuvint al presedintelui, a declarat azi ca oferta lui Basescu a fost ironica.

 

 

DECL: 11/29/2017

TAGS: PREL, MARR, PGOV, RO

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S MEETING WITH SENIOR PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR ON TEO PETER CASE IMPLICATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador Nicholas Taubman for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Ambassador was called to the Presidential Palace 11/29 for an “urgent” meeting with Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Anca Ilinoiu; no further information about the topic was provided in advance. After pleasantries, Ilinoiu cut straight to the chase: the President’s office was aware that a “final USG offer” to Teo Peter’s survivors was imminent, and that the amount of compensation could be in the low six-figure range. She said that while any monetary compensation in this tragic case was inadequate, the amount reportedly being contemplated was clearly an “inadequate sum.” She urged U.S. authorities to consider the entire circumstances surrounding the case, including not only the manner and mode of the accident, but also the impact that the case might have in terms of the overall strategic and security partnership between Romania and the United States.

2. (C) Ilinoiu said that all developments in the Teo Peter case would be the subject of intense public interest. She also reminded the Ambassador that all aspects of our strategic partnership ultimately rested on the strong support that the relationship received from the Romanian public. Even during the worst period of the so-called “battle of the palaces” between President Basescu and Prime Minister Tariceanu, the overwhelmingly positive perception of the United States with the public had remained unchanged and was the bedrock of the relationship. How we managed the Teo Peter case could prove to be a watershed moment in bilateral relations: the public will naturally feel a sense of compassion and empathy with the Peter family, and would see the small sums being offered as an injustice and an insult to the Romanian people. She warned, too, that not all Romanian politicians shared the same positive view of our bilateral equities, and that “certain decisionmakers” might use the event as a “trump card” to damage our common project. She concluded that this was the kind of issue that will resonate, and will not go away in a week or two.

3. (C) Ilinoiu commented that the sums that she had heard being considered would scarcely cover the amount expended by the GOR in this case (which she estimated at around USD $80K). Asked by the Ambassador what sort of figure the GOR had in mind, Ilinoiu did not respond directly, but said that in a previous conversation between President Basescu and

former U.S. Ambassador Rosapepe, Basescu had offered to secretly provide the sum of USD $1 million to the Pentagon in order to ensure that the amount of money being provided to Peters’ survivors was adequate. (Note: Ilinoiu did not specify the circumstances or the timing of this discussion.) She concluded that it was not the precise sums that were problematic, but the message being conveyed to the public. She said she knew that militaries frequently “operated the same way worldwide,” but evinced the hope that a “higher democratic authority” would come to the right decision in the end.

4. (C) Ilinoiu reiterated that the handling of the Peter case had wide-ranging implications for the bilateral relationship. The pending departure of MFA State Secretary Deputy Adrian Vierita as Romania’s new Ambassador to the United States had created a “big hole” in the lineup of senior MFA officials with a strong pro-U.S. alignment. With Romania’s accession to the EU last January, many colleagues were becoming fledgling “born again” Europeans in their outlook, and the Peter case could easily accelerate this process. Ilinoiu also underscored President Basescu’s strong pro-U.S. orientation, but said that even the President had to be in tune with the mood of the Romanian public. Ilinoiu also noted the possible implications for the NATO summit in April. Unlike the strong welcome accorded to President Bush during his last visit, the public’s image of the United States could well change from the overwhelming positive image of the past to that of a nation that was “above the law.” In closing, Ilinoiu urged the Ambassador exert “every effort not to lose the support of the Romanian people.”

TAUBMAN

 

 

DECL: 11/16/2017

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KLIG, MARR, RO

SUBJECT: POTENTIAL IMPACT IN ROMANIA OF TEO PETER OFFER”

Classified By: Ambassador Nicholas F. Taubman for ).Reasons 1.4(b) and (d

1. (C) Summary: The impending “final offer” by Army Foreign Claims Service, Europe to the family Romanian rock star Teofil Peter, who was killed in a 2004 car accident involving Embassy Bucharest’s former Marine detcommander, seems certain to have a significant, negative effect on the U.S.-Romanian relationship. In the likely event that the family of Peter will go public with the news that the U.S. government has met their multi-million dollar settlement claim with an offer of only $80,000, Romanian leaders and opinion makers will react loudly and emotionally, calling into question some of the most important features of our bilateral partnership. President Basescu, PM Tariceanu and other prominent politicians will almost certainly rally to the family’s side, even if some normally pro-American officials will still try behind the scenes to calm the anticipated public outrage. In particular, the popular outcry over what will be seen by most Romanians as an

the U.S. of the late insultingly small offer to Peter’s survivors will prompt renewed calls, with much more potential popular support, for the rapid withdrawal of Romanian troops from Iraq. Likewise, backing in the Romanian parliament and among members of the public for the new U.S. troop presence at joint U.S.-Romanian military facilities on the Black Sea will plummet, at least temporarily. The November 21 notification date to the Peter family’s lawyers is fast approaching, and will nearly coincide with the December 4 anniversary date of Peter’s death, the occasion for past anti-U.S. demonstrations in Romania. In short, we are bracing ourselves for a stormy downturn in the relationship, prompted by the continuing negative legacy of the death of this Romanian cultural icon. Some of the damage to our popular standing and to our interests in Romania may be lasting. End Summary.

2. (C) Teo Peter, one of Romania’s best known and most beloved rock musicians, was killed on December 4, 2004, in a Bucharest car accident involving the taxi he was riding in and the official Embassy vehicle being driven in the early morning hours by former Bucharest Marine detachment commander Staff Sgt. Christopher Van Goethem. Van Goethem departed Romania within a few hours after the accident, under the terms of his diplomatic immunity, but many Romanians viewed his abrupt departure before local investigators had the opportunity to question him and conduct tests on his blood alcohol level as a slap in the face and an effort to shield the Marine from justice. Demonstrations were held outside the Embassy, and an effort was made to rename a nearby street after the deceased musician. Sgt. Van Goethem did subsequently face a range of charges in the U.S. military justice system. A military courts martial concluded in January 2006 that while he was guilty of making false statements and obstructing justice, he was not guilty of the more serious negligent homicide charge. The jury, somewhat unexpectedly, limited the Marine’s punishment to an official letter of reprimand. This news brought, in turn, another wave of protests.

3. (C) The U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe currently plans to send legal representatives of the Peter family final offers amounting to $80,000, divided among three claimants, including Teofil Claudiu Peter, the musician’s son. In briefing material recently forwarded to the Embassy, the Army’s Foreign Claims Service states that the Peter family claims were adjudicated pursuant to the Foreign Claims Act, which “uses foreign law to measure damages.” The accompanying press guidance then asserts: “That means the law of the country in which the claim arises are used — in tQs case Romanian law.” “The awards are consistent with

Romanian court decisions measuring damages in similar cases,” the guidance continues, “and reflect U.S. and Romanian principles of just compensation and respect for human life.” The U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe documents go on to say that the Service contracted “a prestigious Romanian law firm to advise the Commission on the pertinent provisions of the Romanian law…(and) determined that the amount requested by the claimants greatly exceeded the economic loss substantiated by the claimants. Moreover, the Commission found no relevant precedent justifying an award of moral damages anywhere near the amount requested.” Part of the award that has been approved will be centered on reimbursing the family for the funeral costs of Mr. Peter’s burial.

4. (C) Teo Peter’s survivors reportedly initially requested a multi-million dollar settlement. In a November 1 letter to the Ambassador from the Peter family’s law firm, Arent Fox, attorney John M. Gurley suggests that the claimants are currently requesting an award of $1 million. In what is labeled “The Peter Family Claim: October 2007,” Gurley cites various past precedents for awards at that level or above, including for an Australian woman’s successful claim for $1 million after being hit by a Navy serviceman’s golf ball, and a $1.9 million claim to survivors of a teenage Mexican goat herder, the victim ostensibly of an accident involving the U.S. military. Gurley also cites the $2 million awards presented to the survivors of the Italian cable car accident involving a U.S. warplane, a case which has been cited repeatedly in the Romanian media and by Romanian government officials. Gurley writes in his letter that he had unsuccessfully requested a transfer of the claim from the U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe in Mannheim to Fort Meade (the headquarters of the Claims Service) or Washington, D.C. Citing “the very discouraging signals” the Peter family has received to date from the Claims Service, Gurley concludes by saying he hoped the Peter claim could be settled “in a manner suitable to all parties” before the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, asserting that “it would truly be unfortunate for Romania, as well as the United States, if the NATO summit were to be marred by the U.S. government’s inability to close the Teo Peter matter in a fair fashion.”

5. (C) Once the award is communicated to the family’s legal counsel at Arent Fox on Wednesday, November 21 (the day before Thanksgiving), we expect the family and its legal representatives to move quickly to condemn the U.S. Offer publicly and to appeal to top Romanian officials and the Romanian media to put immediate pressure on U.S. representatives for a higher award. Romanian MFA officials have reported to us informally that the family has met with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister in recent weeks to express their determination to conduct a public fight should the final award offer be unacceptably low. Under these circumstances, and in light of the proximity to the anniversary of the rock musician’s death, we expect the Embassy to be the focus of multiple demonstrations, including concerts and candlelight vigils. There will be a renewed effort to rename after Teo Peter the street on which the Embassy is located, and it is possible that city officials may accede to the anticipated wave of public indignation over the amount of the award offer.

6. (C) Another report we received in recent days was a suggestion that Romanian law enforcement authorities, working through EU channels, would attempt to serve a legal summons to Van Goethem, who we believe is currently a U.S. Embassy dependent at AmEmbassy Berlin.

7. (C) More seriously, we anticipate that the Peter award offer, and subsequent media attention, will embolden critics of the Romanian deployment in Iraq, along with other anti-American politicians like Chamber of Deputies President Bogdan Olteanu, to call for the immediate withdrawal of Romanian troops. Under these circumstances, they could build sufficient traction to reinvigorate the opposition to Romania’s support for U.S. efforts there, and potentially force a change in policy. While President Basescu has been steadfast in his support for our continued troop presence in Iraq, he would be conscious of the fact that even before a renewed public outcry over the Peter case, only one-third of the Romanian public supports maintaining troops there. Either way, reinvigoration of the controversy over U.S. handling of the case will put our closest friends within the Romanian government, including President Basescu, into a very awkward political position. Likely enough, the Liberal Party and other political groups hoping to find a hook to boost their support in the run-up to the November 25 Euro-parliamentary elections in Romania will wrap themselves in the flag and try to capitalize on the political moment with anti-U.S. political rhetoric. More broadly, news of the Peter award offer will cut deeply into support for the new U.S. military presence at joint facilities on the Black Sea, including Kogalniceanu air base and the Babadag training grounds — at least temporarily. While public approval of the bases has been steady, our contacts have always cautioned us that it is vulnerable to concerns over an increased terrorist threat to Romania — and to negative stories concerning the conduct of U.S. service personnel, with the first point of reference the Teo Peter accident and the subsequent handling of the charges against Sgt. Van Goethem.

8. (C) There are other, less predictable, risk factors at play. In the wake of this week’s controversy over the Ambassador’s criticism of the Parliament’s efforts to undermine the independence of Romanian prosecutors and their ability to investigate cases of bribery and corruption, a controversy over the Teo Peter award could enable our critics and opponents on the Romanian political scene to undermine other important initiatives which are just gathering momentum. First and foremost among them is our accelerating effort, alongside Lockheed-Martin, to persuade Romania to pursue an F-16/JSF option to replace the country’s aging MiG fleet. Lockheed-Martin, in tandem with allies in the Presidency and Ministry of Defense, are seeking a “sole-source” route to the fighter plane decision, which they do not want to see tied up in the Brussels bureaucracy by the F-16/JSF’s principal European competitors, Grippen and Eurofighter. This was always going to be a tricky exercise, with an expectation that supporters of a European fighter option would loudly cry foul. A firestorm over the Teo Peter case could possibly represent a tipping point away from a U.S. option, if only because of the optics.

9. (C) What little guidance we have received from the U.S. Army Claims Service, Europe suggests that all Romanian media inquiries are to be steered towards the USAREUR public affairs staff, or alternatively USMC spokespersons at Quantico. This will limit severely our ability to respond here in Romania, and to help address some of the most pernicious charges that we will face. We believe that the risk of unintended consequences in this media strategy, across geographic, language and cultural barriers, is huge. That, too, has to be factored into our overall risk assessment of the impending Claims Service actions.

10.(C) In short, our hope is that this latest policy and public affairs challenge related to the 2004 car accident will be manageable. But we are concerned that under the present circumstances, some lasting damage could be done to our core interests, including keeping Romanian troops deployed in Iraq and continuing to build on the positive momentum in our close defense and security partnership with Bucharest. This has been an especially difficult issue from the beginning, and remains the biggest single “black spot” in our recent bilateral experience.

TAUBMAN

 

 

DECL: 02/01/16

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KCRM, ASEC, SOCI, MARR, MOPS, RO

SUBJECT: VANGOETHEM VERDICT, SENTENCING ROILS U.S.-ROMANIAN RELATIONS

Classified By: Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Mark Taplin 1.4 B and D

1. (C) Summary. The acquittal of former MSG Detachment Commander Christopher VanGoethem on January 31 of negligent homicide, along with the news that he would only receive a reprimand for his conduct, has roiled U.S.-Romanian relations. The denouement of the case will likely complicate ratification by the Romanian parliament of the U.S. Romanian defense cooperation agreement, signed by Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Ungureanu in December. President Traian Basescu on February 1 expressed surprise and shock at the verdict to the Ambassador and stated it would be difficult for the GOR to “justify having U.S. soldiers in Romania under the same circumstances.” Foreign Minister Razvan Ungureanu urged a quick public explanation from the Ambassador and the USG to defuse public outrage. He also urged close coordination between our governments during what could be a difficult stretch of public criticism and private misgivings about what had appeared until just yesterday to be a model strategic partnership. End Summary.

2. (SBU) The Romanian media reacted with shock and outrage to news of the January 31 acquittal on negligent homicide charges by a U.S. court martial of former Embassy Bucharest MSG DET Commander Staff Sergeant Chris VanGoethem. The latter was involved in a December 4, 2003 automobile accident that led to the death of top Romanian rock star Teo Peter. The media has also focused on what was universally seen by Romanians as a derisory sentence — a letter of reprimand — for the two charges of obstructing justice and making false statements for which VanGoethem was found guilty. Comments from Teo Peter’s son and brother expressed both cold rage and confusion at the verdict, and their comments have been played over and over again on Romanian media today. Prime Minister Calin Popescu-Tariceanu, on an official visit to Ankara, labeled the verdict “surprising, bizarre to say the least,” and President Basescu was no less critical. “It’s inadmissible,” he was quoted as saying after a public gathering of Ministry of Interior officials, adding that “Twenty-two million people in Romania saw what happened to Teo Peter. This would mean that what twenty-two million people saw was untrue.” Some analysts were already speculating on the possible impact on our broader bilateral relationship, including the agreement on U.S. use of military facilities on Romanian territory.

3. (C) The Ambassador has reached out to the most senior levels of government, including the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, to reiterate our deep regret over the car accident that killed the Romanian musician and to encourage coordination of U.S. and Romanian responses in coming days. The Embassy at all levels has sought to defuse this new wave of public anger over the tragic accident and now over the verdict and sentencing.

Basescu: Concerned about Defense Agreement

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4. (C) President Traian Basescu, in a brief telephone conversation with the Ambassador on February 4, expressed “surprise” with the outcome. Describing the verdict as a fait accompli, Basescu stated simply that it “will not be easy to continue justifying U.S. soldiers here under the same circumstances.” The Ambassador expressed remorse for the accident and understanding of Romanian shock at the verdict. He committed to do all he could to ensure that nothing like the December 4 accident happens again. He also committed to do everything possible to prevent the verdict from jeopardizing our strong bilateral relationship.

5. (SBU) Although the Ambassador has reached out to Prime Minister Tariceanu, the latter is traveling in Turkey and as of the evening of February 1 the two had not spoken by phone.

Tariceanu has both condemned the verdict and pledged GOR assistance to Peter’s family if it seeks to file a civil case against VanGoethem.

FM Ungureanu: A “Firestorm” in Public Opinion

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6. (C) FM Ungureanu expressed appreciation to the Ambassador for reaching out to the MFA and agreeing to meet so soon after the verdict. During an expanded meeting that included DCM and PolChief, Ungureanu described the verdict as a potential catalyst for a “firestorm” of negative Romanian public opinion against the U.S., something which could damage our common goals and objectives. He said he could not understate how serious the issue is for all who care about Romania’s bilateral relations with the U.S. He urged the Ambassador to speak publicly and openly to the media that afternoon, to avoid the perception that the U.S. was “hiding in a dark corner.” He committed to coordinate with the Embassy on Romania’s public approach and asked for informal ideas and advice on a common strategy for moving ahead.

7. (C) At the same time, Ungureanu stressed that the GOR could not afford to appear passive in response to the “unjust verdict.” He wondered aloud whether the GOR or Teo Peter’s family could pursue civil actions; or if there were other ways that the family, and by extension the Romanian government, could be satisfied that justice had been served. Ungureanu added that he planned to call Secretary Rice this afternoon (meaning February 1 a.m. in Washington), and that he would raise the same concerns that he had raised with the Ambassador. Our common task was “not to dig deeper” but to “see how we can heal.”

8. (C) In a separate private conversation with the Ambassador, Ungureanu expressed explicit concern that the verdict would have an impact on the bilateral agreement on military facilities, which is in now before the Romanian parliament for ratification. He was worried not only about the pernicious effects of criticism from the political opposition, but also from the general public. In Ungureanu’s view, it was important that U.S. authorities at all levels, including within the Department of Defense, demonstrate appropriate compassion and concern as well as understanding of the many difficulties posed by the verdict. He urged not only a prompt response in this regard, but thorough consideration of how to conscientiously help ensure the U.S.-Romania bilateral relationship remains on track.

Comment: Challenges Following the Verdict

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9. (C) Regardless of the actual verdict against VanGoethem, in the court of Romanian public opinion he was guilty as charged. For many, more shocking still was the sentence, which political commentators and our government interlocutors consider risibly light, both a a slap on the wrist for the Marine sergeant and a slap in the face to Romania. Nor could the timing of this unexpected turn of events have been more inopportune given that the Romanian parliament currently has before it for debate and ratification the signed agreement on military cooperation between the U.S.. Both ordinary Romanians and government officials will scrutinize the U.S. reaction in coming days and months. It is essential that the U.S. government, on a combined basis, in both capitals, do the maximum we possibly can to express our regret over the whole VanGoethem matter, respond in an open and respectful way to Romania’s need to manage this crisis here in a politically plausible way, and reassure Bucharest of our continued reliability as a friend and partner.

TAUBMAN

 

 

DECL: 03/04/2015 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, ECON, RS, MD, RO

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PRESIDENT BASESCU’S MARCH 8-9 TRIP TO WASHINGTON

REF: A. A) BUCHAREST 476 B. B) BUCHAREST 429

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Thomas Delare for Reasons 1.4 B and D

1. (C) Summary: During the first few months of his mandate, President Traian Basescu has pledged to vigorously battle corruption, supported implementation of free market economic reforms and promised to steer Romania to EU accession in 2007. Basescu is intellectually and emotionally pro-American- a stalwart supporter of the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and firmly committed to transatlantic values and institutions. He views Romania’s strategic partnership with the U.S. as the lynchpin of his nation’s foreign policy and he will underscore that commitment during his March 8-9 visit to Washington. End Summary.

2. (C) Romania’s new president, Traian Basescu, travels to Washington March 8-9 with the hope of cementing ties with the country he has characterized as “absolutely fundamental” for Romania’s strategic interests. Intuitively and intellectually pro-American, Basescu and his team view this trip not only as important for bilateral relations, but also as central to what he and his presidency have come to represent — a strong orientation towards the U.S., free market economic reform, and democratic change that brings Romanian democracy closer to the people. Throughout his political life, Basescu has earned a reputation as straightforward, plainspoken, and charismatic. A former merchant marine captain and twice-elected mayor of Bucharest, Basescu offers a populist touch that contrasts sharply with the previous political leadership known for paternalism, formality, and a lack of transparency. He has entered office committed to combating corruption and fully integrating Romania into European and transatlantic institutions.

Romania’s “Orange Revolution”

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3. (C) Basescu’s upset presidential victory against former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase on December 12 surprised even his closest political advisors and ushered in a new era of center-right government. Upon the initial release of results on election night, youthful supporters clad in orange flooded the streets of central Bucharest in a scene reminiscent of events in neighboring Ukraine the week before. In subsequent weeks he appointed center-right co-leader Calin Popescu-Tariceanu as prime minister, and rebuffed attempts by the then ruling Social Democratic Party (PSD) to maintain a hold on the government and parliament. Basescu and Tariceanu asserted that they were committed to leadership untainted by corruption or communist pasts. As a result, the new cabinet they formed is the youngest in Romania’s post-communist history, with an average age in the late 30′s. It also includes many members with solid experience in the private sector and NGO community.

4. (C) In its slightly more than two months in office, the new government has implemented bold measures such as introducing a 16 percent flat tax on incomes and corporate profits and declaring the fight against high-level corruption as a national security priority. On the latter issue, there has been movement on several large-scale corruption cases, including a scandal involving the erasure of massive tax arrears owed by a politically connected oil refining company. In an attempt to redress some of the wrongs committed under communist rule, Basescu has vowed to open up additional files of the notorious former secret police for public inspection. He has also promised to reform Romania’s inefficient and often corrupt judiciary, putting several agency heads on notice that he is closely monitoring their work and will be making personnel decisions based on their effectiveness in the near future. On another sore point, Basescu has already taken steps to make good on his pledge to eliminate political pressure on the Romanian media, a significant problem under the previous government.

These actions have boosted his post-election popularity to new heights. He has publicly stated that he will be “the most hands-on president” since Romania’s 1989 return to democratic rule.

Seeking Strong Transatlantic Ties

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5. (C) During his presidential campaign, Basescu repeatedly made reference to what he called a “Bucharest-London-Washington” axis. He clearly intended to emphasize that his government would seek to strengthen Romania’s “strategic partnership” with the U.S. and Britain. We understand such assertions have raised eyebrows in Brussels, Paris, and Berlin. Nonetheless, Basescu has refused to back off his robustly pro-American stance. When pressed by the media as to what such a special relationship would entail, Basescu has pointed to the importance of a U.S. role in the Black Sea region and Romania’s solid commitment to the NATO alliance. More fundamentally, however, Basescu and his advisors have stressed that this policy orientation is grounded in shared democratic values, including a commitment to combating dictatorship and promoting freedom.

6. (C) In his public appearances and discussions with U.S. officials, including the President, Basescu will undoubtedly seek our endorsement of his vision of a stronger strategic relationship. Should he go into detail, we are likely to hear about Romanian desire to push forward on enhanced cooperation in the Black Sea area ) to include joint promotion of democratic values or initiatives to boost economic reform in littoral states. He may also raise the concept of a Black Sea Trust Fund to be located in Bucharest, along the model of the Balkan Trust Fund in Belgrade. Such a fund would be aimed at strengthening civic participation and democratic governance in the region. Romania has not fleshed

out the idea beyond a conceptual phase, but Basescu may ask for our overt support. Finally, Basescu is clearly enthused about the &Orange Revolution8 that swept into power in Ukraine and here and would like to use the momentum he perceives to help jar loose the long frozen conflict between Moldova and Transnistria with the direct involvement of Romania. Washington should read the last point, at a minimum, as a desire to be included in the current multilateral framework under OSCE aegis (See also Ref A).

7. (C) Basescu and Tariceanu have also reaffirmed strong support for a potential U.S. basing presence in Romania. They view such proposed basing as confirmation of the trust the U.S. has in Romania as an ally.

A Steadfast GWOT Ally: Romania in Iraq and Afghanistan; Emerging Strategy of Terrorist Preemption

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8. (C) Romania has been a continuous supporter of U.S. led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Basescu has vowed to ensure a Romanian troop presence in those countries “as long as necessary.” Romania has maintained more than 700 troops in Iraq, and is deploying an additional infantry company for UN force protection. In Afghanistan, more than 400 Romanian soldiers serve alongside U.S. forces. Romania has made its military facilities and airspace fully available to U.S. forces. Basescu has pledged to support Afghan authorities in upcoming parliamentary elections and has promised to deploy a battalion in support of those elections.

9. (C) In general, the commitment to the GWOT, Afghanistan, and Iraq receives broad bipartisan support in Romania, with few calls from the media or opinion leaders for a departure from this policy. The Basescu administration has actively expressed support for the GWOT in international fora such as the UN and endorses President Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative. Finally, the Ministry of Defense has announced its intention to adopt a strategy of preemption vis-a-vis international terrorism. This point is to be made in a defense white paper that is expected to see further definition and the light of day in about 30 days time.

Forging Ahead on EU Accession

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10. (C) Basescu and his government are staunchly committed to securing Romania’s 2007 EU accession. This enjoys widespread political and popular support, though the average Romanian remains unclear about the specific implications of EU membership. Most view EU accession, together with 2004 NATO membership, as solidifying Romania’s Western orientation

after decades of communist rule. Basescu is slated to go to Brussels in late April to sign Romania’s accession treaty, an historic step that will set in motion the final process for implementing EU-mandated reforms. EU member officials tell us Romania’s membership in 2007 is almost certain, and would only be impeded by a major interruption in democratic governance or backsliding in anti-corruption efforts or other reforms.

Some Points of Contention: Adoptions, Awards, Accidents and (Business) Acrimony ——————————————— ————-

11.(C) While overall relations with Romania are excellent, there are a number of contentious issues which have either eluded resolution or which, though moving in a positive direction, could benefit from the attention of the White House or other USG authorities. At the same time, at least one contentious issue is likely to be raised by the Romanians.

12.(C) The first issue is Romania’s failure thus far to resolve over 200 pending intra-country adoption cases for U.S. parents. Although just a few weeks ago Basescu and his government pledged privately to create an international commission to review and resolve these outstanding cases, advisors in recent days have told us that pressure from the European Commission is making it “even more difficult” for Basescu and Tariceanu to carry out such a plan at present. A direct and pointed request from President Bush that these cases be resolved may offer the only possibility for moving the Romanian government forward towards setting up a commission. Basescu may agree to do so after key events related to EU accession take place in April.

13.(C) The second issue is the awarding in December by the previous Romanian president of Romania,s highest honor, the Star of Romania, to ultra-nationalist, anti-Semitic politician Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Nobel Prize laureate Elie Wiesel immediately resigned his membership in the Order of the Star and — along with prominent U.S. and international Jewish leaders — continues to call for Romania to revoke Tudor’s award. The U.S. Embassy similarly has pressed Basescu and advisors to take appropriate action. Basescu’s team tells us the government is on the verge of setting up a process to revoke the award, with the mechanism likely to be in place before Basescu’s trip to Washington.

14.(C) The new Romanian Government’s apparent willingness to tackle business issues requiring considerable political capital and courage ) notably including high-level corruption, radical tax reform and labor code reform – have drawn plaudits from U.S. business. Nevertheless, compliments about the anti-corruption stance of the government should be linked with strong encouragement for appropriate prosecutions and effective implementation of numerous pieces of dormant anti-corruption legislation. We note that the absence of a mention of corruption will be taken as a sign of indifference, not an impression we should make.

15.(C) On the negative side, the new government has been dilatory in meeting some contractual obligations with U.S. firms or in addressing flawed privatization contracts put in place by the last government that clearly disadvantage a number of U.S. purchasers. In regard to the former, the largest project ever won by an American firm in this country has suffered from extensive contract reviews and payment delays. In this instance, Bechtel’s 2.5 billion USD road project linking South-Central Romania to the Hungarian border has teetered on the brink of cancellation for months. Although some monies have just begun to flow, Bechtel is still owed about 90 million USD for work completed. In addition, we understand that privatization difficulties may be raised by Congressional interlocutors of President Basescu. If so, the complaints will likely relate to the flawed privatization conditions imposed by the last government that have prevented some U.S. purchasers from restructuring their new assets to become competitive. Noteworthy here are difficulties experienced by the U.S. purchases of 4×4 auto maker ARO.

16.(C) Finally, President Basescu can be expected to raise the December 2004 accident involving the U.S. Embassy Marine Security Guard detachment commander that led to the death of Romanian rock star Teo Peter. Basescu is under considerable political pressure to make sure justice is done in a Romanian Court. Naturally, given that Marine Corps legal proceedings against the former detachment commander have not even begun, the question of extradition and lifting of the Marine’s immunity cannot even be addressed at the present time. Nevertheless, President Basescu may strongly ask for White House support for the Marine’s return, probably repeating a promise made earlier to our Ambassador that the former detachment commander would receive a fair trial and, regardless of outcome, would not serve a single day in prison in Romania.

Comment

17. (C) President Basescu is a plain speaking man who is not inclined to dodge a problem. To his credit, his schedule includes a meeting with American adoptive parents and a visit

to the Holocaust Museum. In these cases, his advisors tell us that he will address the irritations of both groups, though neither may be wholly satisfied with the progress made to date or the explanation of constraints on his freedom to act. On the question of the Marine and the death of the local rock star, the President has treated this extremely unfortunate event with dignity, not stooping to agitate the press for short-term political gain. That latter sort of behavior was characteristic of former PM Adrian Nastase, Basescu’s erst while rival for the presidency. Nevertheless, nasty pressure from that same political quarter will compel President Basescu to make a plea for Romanian justice and the return of the former Marine detachment commander, so that he may demonstrate his ability to stand up for Romania.

18. (C) Despite the potential negatives, the overall accent should remain on the positive. Romania and President Basescu are extremely desirous of a closer strategic relationship and they continue to give substance to that desire with their unswerving commitment of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. They see themselves capable of further contributions and will strongly make a case for bilateral cooperation in fostering political and economic reform, as well as strategic cooperation, in the Black Sea region. Finally, Washington should note that President Basescu is an aggressive politician. In his domestic campaigning he was clearly a master of making his opponent react to him. Under attack, he can deliver a terrific counterstroke. But it is also apropos to note that he is inclined to act in what he sees as Romania,s interest, even if it breaks crockery. Specifically, Washington should expect a strong push from him to rethink the approach to solutions of the Moldova-Transnistria problem. Basescu is enthused about undisputed changes underway in South-East Europe and want to use those events to break the status quo.

19.(U) Amembassy Bucharest’s Reporting telegrams, as well as daily press summaries, are available on the Bucharest SIPRNet website: www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/bucharest DELARE

 

 

DECL: 03/24/2015 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KDEM, SOCI, ECON, PHUM, EINV, EFIN, RO, ETRO, biographic information, political assessment

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE ZOELLICK’S MARCH 30 VISIT TO BUCHAREST

REF: A. A) BUCHAREST 476 B. B) BUCHAREST 429

Classified By: CHARGE D’AFFAIRES THOMAS DELARE FOR REASONS 1.4 A, B ANDD

1. (C) Introduction and Summary: Embassy Bucharest warmly welcomes your March 30 visit as a tangible demonstration of the deepening U.S./Romanian partnership. Your visit will provide an opportunity to underscore the points raised during the successful March 8-10 visit by newly elected President Traian Basescu to Washington. During the first few months of their mandates, President Basescu and Prime Minister Calin Popescu Tariceanu pledged to vigorously battle corruption, supported implementation of free market economic reforms and promised to steer Romania to EU accession in 2007. We note, however, that the charismatic and staunchly pro-U.S. Basescu has more energetically asserted the primacy of the U.S.-Romanian strategic alliance than Tariceanu and FM Mihai Razvan Ungureanu, whose pro-American views are tempered by a generally Euro-centric philosophy. Nonetheless, both the PM and FM share Basescu’s view that Romania should remain a stalwart supporter in the GWOT and seek to deepen its integration into transatlantic values and institutions. Your visit will permit you to discuss Romanian progress on key issues raised during President Basescu’s visit earlier this month, including plans to lift Romania’s ban on international adoptions. End Introduction and Summary.

Romania’s “Orange Revolution”

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2. (C) Basescu’s upset presidential victory against former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase on December 12 surprised even his closest political advisors and ushered in a new era of center-right government following four years of political dominance by the center-left Social Democratic Party (PSD), whose senior leaders were viewed by many Romanians as arrogant and corrupt. Upon the initial release of results on election night, youthful Basescu supporters clad in orange flooded the streets of central Bucharest in a scene reminiscent of events in neighboring Ukraine the week before.

In subsequent weeks, Basescu appointed center-right co-leader Calin Popescu-Tariceanu as prime minister, and rebuffed attempts by the PSD to maintain a hold on the government and parliament. Basescu and Tariceanu asserted that they were committed to leadership untainted by corruption or communist pasts.

3. (C) The new cabinet they formed is the youngest in Romania’s post-communist history, with an average age in the late 30′s, including FM Ungureanu, who was a Foreign Ministry State Secretary from 1998 to 2000. The cabinet also includes many members with solid experience in the private sector and NGO community. However, the new government is faced with a

significant minority opposition in parliament and, with such a new team, is still working to get its “sea legs” in handling tough domestic and international issues. We have seen occasional signs of tension between the robustly pro-American Basescu and the more Euro-centric Tariceanu (a francophone who made his fortune as owner of a Citroen distributorship) and Ungureanu in the first several months of the new government. On one occasion, for example, the FM publicly qualified the President’s endorsement of “preemptive” anti-terrorist actions by the GOR as “mere intellectual exercises.” A senior Basescu adviser recently lamented to Embassy that the PM’s office and key ministries appear (at least to the Presidency) as sometimes disorganized and lacking focus.

Seeking Strong Transatlantic Ties

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4. (C) During his presidential campaign, Basescu repeatedly made reference to what he called a “Bucharest-London-Washington” axis. He clearly intended to emphasize that his government would seek to strengthen Romania’s “strategic partnership” with the U.S. and Britain. We understand such assertions have raised eyebrows in Brussels, Paris, and Berlin. Nonetheless, Basescu has refused to back off his robustly pro-American stance. When pressed by the media as to what such a special relationship would entail, Basescu has pointed to the importance of a U.S. role in the Black Sea region and Romania’s solid commitment to the NATO alliance. Post has sensed a somewhat less enthusiastic response on this policy from PM Tariceanu and FM Ungureanu, who are keenly focused on securing Romania’s proposed 2007 EU accession.

5. (C) Nonetheless, the PM and FM share Basescu’s desire for a strong strategic relationship with the U.S., including enhanced cooperation in the Black Sea area. Since Basescu’s visit to Washington, senior MFA interlocutors have underscored to Charge and other Embassy officers the GOR view that the Black Sea region is central to Romania’s security, urging the USG to weigh in with other littoral states, especially Turkey, in support of Romania’s proposed establishment of a Romanian-Bulgarian-Turkish “Black Sea Task Force” linked to NATO structures. This proposal, however, exists only on paper and the GOR tells us that Turkey opposes it, preferring an expanded role for BLACKSEAFOR and Turkish-led Operation Harmony.

6. (C) Basescu and his team are clearly enthused about the “Orange Revolution” that swept into power in Ukraine and here and would like to use the momentum to help jar loose the long

frozen conflict between Moldova and Transnistria. With the strong support of FM Ungureanu and lower-level advisors in the MFA, Basescu has vocally advocated increasing Romania’s role in the settlement process and improving previously tepid relations with neighboring Moldova. At a minimum, this stance reflects a desire to be included in the current multilateral framework under OSCE aegis (See also Ref A). However, Basescu is clearly not inclined to a passive role. He surprised his own Foreign Ministry with a trip to Chisinau within days of assuming the Presidency. Just back from consultations in Berlin, Basescu told the Charge that Schroeder backed away from offering suggestions regarding Moldova-Transnistria. To that, Basescu said that he replied that he “and the Americans would solve it and the Germans wouldn’t like it.”

7. (C) Basescu and Tariceanu have also reaffirmed strong support for a potential U.S. basing presence in Romania. They view such proposed basing as confirmation of the trust the U.S. has in Romania as an ally. Romania’s support for basing, as well as its emphasis on Black Sea regional security, reflect an underlying and longstanding concern about Russian military and economic domination of the region.

A Steadfast GWOT Ally: Romania in Iraq and Afghanistan; Emerging Strategy of Terrorist Preemption

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8. (C) Romania has been a continuous supporter of U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Basescu repeatedly has vowed to ensure a Romanian troop presence in those countries “as long as necessary.” Romania maintains more than 750 troops in Iraq, as well as recently deploying an additional infantry company of about 100 personnel for UN force protection. In Afghanistan, more than 400 Romanian soldiers serve alongside U.S. forces. Romania has made its military facilities and airspace fully available to U.S. forces. PM Tariceanu and FM Ungureanu will likely echo Basescu’s open ended pledge to maintain Romanian troops in both Iraq and Afghanistan as long as they are needed. It is noteworthy that the latest iteration of that commitment was made after the recent decisions of Poland and Ukraine to draw down their troop levels in Iraq.

9. (C) In general, the commitment to the GWOT, Afghanistan, and Iraq receives broad bipartisan support in Romania, with few calls from the media or opinion leaders for a departure from this policy. The government has actively expressed support for the GWOT in international fora such as the UN and endorses President Bush’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and is currently discussing with us possible ways to support the PSI in the Black Sea region. In the UN Commission for Human Rights, Romania supported resolutions on Cuba and Belarus. Romania currently holds a rotating UN Security Council Seat and views its membership on the UNSC as one way of bolstering its regional and international stature.

Finally, we expect to see issuance of an MOD White Paper within days that will highlight terrorist preemption as one of a half a dozen key strategies. While this is consonant with U.S. thinking, it has also been attacked by foreign policy pundits on the left including ex-Foreign Minister Geoana, for its ostensible hubris and overreach.

Rosy Macroeconomic Picture…

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10.(C) In its slightly more than two months in office, the new government has implemented bold measures championed by PM Tariceanu, such as introducing a 16 percent flat tax on incomes and corporate profits and declaring the fight against high-level corruption as a national security priority. On the latter issue, there has been movement on several large-scale corruption cases, including a scandal involving the erasure of massive tax arrears owed by a politically connected oil refining company. In the battle against corruption, independent observers have noted an energy and intensity lacking under the previous government.

11.(SBU) Romania has significantly improved its macroeconomic situation in the past few years, cutting inflation to below 10 percent in 2004 for the first time since the 1989 Revolution. For the past several years, Romania posted GDP growth close to 5 percent, peaking at 8.3 percent last year owing to an extremely favorable harvest, surging exports and robust construction.

12.(SBU) Overall, foreign direct investment (FDI) is growing, but is still relatively low for Eastern and Central Europe. The total net stock of FDI between 1990 and 2004 amounted to almost $13.6 billion. Leading country investors are the Netherlands, Austria, France, Germany, U.S. (6.5 percent), and Italy. In 2004, U.S. investment rose 26.1 percent to $888.4 million. Despite good macro-economic news, many potential American investors still perceive Romania as a high-risk country for doing business due to corruption and a weak judicial system. However, investors are tending more bullish and the recent rise in Moody’s rating for foreign currency denominated bonds (Ba1) has been cited by many as a positive sign.

13. (SBU) Additionally, Romanian 2004 exports posted record

levels * up 33.8 percent in USD from 2003. However, Romanian exporters fear that 2005 may slow export growth, reflecting appreciation of the ROL toward the Euro and the USD. Although agricultural exports mark a major bright spot in U.S. trade with Romania, reaching $197 million in 2004, this growing U.S. agricultural trade balance is threatened by Romania,s expected EU accession in 2007. In particular, the EU is expected to pressure Romania to end its interest in biotechnology production (corn and soybeans) and unrestricted beef imports.

…But Sticking Points Remain with IMF

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14.(SBU) The Government of Romania is attempting to secure IMF agreement to a combined second and third review of its current standby arrangement. Romanian officials want to conclude this review in part to satisfy EU demands that IMF attention continue to encourage sound Romanian macro economic policies. However, the IMF and the Romanian government differ over macro-economic targets-the IMF wants a deficit target of 0.4 percent of GDP for the 2005 budget, while Romania insists on a 0.7 percent, arguing that the higher ceiling will allow Romania to invest in urgent infrastructure improvements. The GOR also rejects the IMF,s current recommendations to increase the flat tax and the VAT, pointing to rising tax revenues in the first two months of 2004 as evidence that any revenue fall off will not be substantiated. Discussions with the IMF are ongoing and Basescu told us he secured a 3-month breathing space from the IMF to make Romania’s case. Your interlocutors may stress that they view the IMF’s treatment of the GOR as “rigid,” especially given the current government’s reform-oriented, pro-market focus.

15.(SBU) Tariffs remain one of the few contentious issues in our bilateral economic relationship. Romanian tariffs on U.S. imports are a problem the U.S. Embassy has been discussing with the GOR for more than 2 years. Romania lowered its tariffs to the EU Common External Tariff (CXT) for EU countries, but maintains higher levels for non-EU trading partners, including the U.S., with Romanian government officials claiming they are under intense pressure from the EU to maintain tariffs at current levels for non-EU partners until EU Accession.

16.(SBU) Romania recognizes its legal obligation to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) as a signatory to several international conventions and its domestic legislation provides only adequate theoretical protection. Romanian anti-piracy efforts are uncoordinated and a low priority for police, border police, customs, financial guard, prosecutors and courts. The U.S. Embassy has recommended that Romania remain on the Watch List for 2005.

Forging Ahead on EU Accession

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17.(C) Basescu and his government are committed to securing Romania’s 2007 EU accession, with PM Tariceanu and FM Ungureanu out in front on Romania’s lobbying efforts in Brussels and EU capitals. EU membership enjoys widespread political and popular support, though the average Romanian remains unclear about the specific implications of EU membership. The Basescu government and press have begun to warn the public that accession strains will be significant, particularly as non-competitive firms close and many agricultural units unable to meet higher standards are forced to exit the market. Most simply view EU accession, together with 2004 NATO membership, as solidifying Romania’s Western orientation after decades of communist rule. Basescu is slated to go to Luxembourg in late April to sign Romania’s accession treaty, an historic step that will set in motion the final process for implementing EU-mandated reforms. EU member officials tell us Romania’s membership in 2007 is almost certain, and would only be impeded by a major interruption in democratic governance or backsliding in anti-corruption efforts or other reforms.

Confronting the Communist Past

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18.(C) In an attempt to redress some of the wrongs committed under communist rule, Basescu has vowed to open up additional files of the notorious former secret police for public inspection. He and the PM also promised to reform Romania’s inefficient and often corrupt judiciary, putting several agency heads on notice that their work is being closely monitored for its effectiveness. On another sore point, Basescu and his team have already taken steps to make good on his pledge to eliminate political pressure on the Romanian media, a significant problem under the previous government. These actions have boosted the governing alliance’s post-election popularity to new heights. One area of potential conflict between Basescu and the PM stems from the president’s public support for “snap elections,” a move generally opposed within Tariceanu’s center-right National Liberal Party (PNL) and other members of the center-right governing alliance.

Continuing Points of Contention: Adoptions, Awards, Accidents and(Business)Acrimony ——————————————— ——

19. (C) While overall relations with Romania are excellent, there are a number of contentious issues which have either eluded resolution or could benefit from further discussion. Each of these issues was raised during Basescu’s March 8-10 visit to Washington.

20.(C) The first issue is Romania’s failure thus far to resolve over 200 pending inter-country adoption cases for U.S. parents. During his visit to Washington on March 8-10, Basescu met separately with President Bush and a group of American prospective adoptive parents. In both meetings, he said that Romania’s new law prohibiting inter-country adoptions is too restrictive, but explained that his government could not move forward on this issue before the EU and Romania sign the accession treaty on April 25. Basescu told the parents’ group that he felt an international review commission, an idea earlier mooted by the last government, the U.S. and several EU states, may not be necessary and might only delay the process. It is thus unclear exactly how the Romanian government will decide to address the pending cases. Your meetings will provide an opportunity to welcome President Basescu’s commitments in Washington - and to urge Romania to move ahead with resolving pending adoption cases.

21.(U) At his meeting with Basescu on March 9, President Bush responded positively to an on-the-spot request from Basescu to include Romania and Bulgaria in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) road map. The Romanian government understands that Romania does not yet meet the criteria for inclusion in the VWP, but that we are interested in helping them understand what is needed to get to that point.

22.(C) Also contentious was the awarding in December by the previous Romanian president of Romania’s highest honor, the Star of Romania, to the xenophobic and extremist politician Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Nobel Prize laureate Elie Wiesel immediately resigned his membership in the Order of the Star and — along with prominent U.S. and international Jewish leaders — continues to call for Romania to revoke Tudor’s award. The U.S. Embassy similarly has pressed Basescu and advisors to take appropriate action. Basescu’s team tells us the government is on the verge of setting up a process to revoke the award, but a senior Basescu advisor recently told us that the revocation process involves sailing in uncharted waters and could take “some time.” Separately, we are encouraged by signs that both the presidency and Tariceanu government appear committed to transparent and fair resolution of property restitution claims stemming from the WWII era and communist period.

23.(C) The new Romanian Government’s apparent willingness to tackle business issues requiring considerable political capital and courage - notably including high-level corruption, radical tax reform and labor code reform - have drawn plaudits from U.S. businesses. Nevertheless, compliments about the anti-corruption stance of the government should be linked with strong encouragement for appropriate prosecutions and effective implementation of numerous pieces of dormant anti-corruption legislation.

24.(C) On the negative side, the new government has been dilatory in meeting some contractual obligations with U.S. firms and in addressing flawed privatization contracts put in place by the last government that clearly disadvantage a number of U.S. purchasers. In regard to the former, the largest project ever won by an American firm in this country has suffered from extensive contract reviews and payment delays. In this instance, Bechtel’s 2.5 billion USD road project linking South-Central Romania to the Hungarian border has teetered on the brink of cancellation for months. Although about 90 million USD have been paid, Bechtel is still owed substantial sums for work completed. Also problematic are complaints about flawed privatization conditions imposed by the last government that have prevented some U.S. purchasers from restructuring their new assets to become competitive. Noteworthy here are difficulties experienced by the U.S. purchases of 4×4 automaker ARO. On a more positive note, a border surveillance contract issued without tender to


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